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NOTES AND COMMENTS
To Be or Not to Be: The Validity of Pendent Party
Jurisdiction Remains Unanswered After Finley v.

United States
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Supreme Court decided Finley v. United States/ most
federal courts chose to exercise pendent party jurisdiction in Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 2 actions when presented with the opportunity to consolidate related claims in a single forum. 3 In contrast, Finley
v. United States arose from the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to consistently oppose pendent party jurisdiction in FTCA and all other federal actions.'' For more than a decade, the Supreme Court's dicta in
Aldinger v. Howard 5 fueled judicial debate on the validity of pendent
party jurisdiction in FTCA actions. In Aldinger, the Court specifically
named the FTCA as an example of a federal statute which might properly support a pendent party jurisdiction claim. 6 While the 5-4 decision
in Finley suggests that the Aldinger dicta was but one vote short of
becoming law, the Court held that the FTCA does not permit the exer1. I 09 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1988).
3. Cases allowing pendent party jurisdiction in FTCA actions include Brown v. United
States, 838 F.2d 1157 (II th Cir. 1988) (affirming Lykins); Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645,
64 7 (lith Cir. 1984) (there is "no express or implied negation of the federal courts' power to hear
pendent party claims" in the FTCA); Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir.
1982) (pendent party jurisdiction is proper under the FTCA since the "waiver of immunity,
granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts of such tort suits against the Government, was
made in sweeping language"); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (joining
additional parties to an FTCA action will not "contravene any congressional statute").
4. Ninth Circuit cases denying pendent party jurisdiction include Carpenters S. Cal. Admin.
Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1984); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982); Idaho ex rei. Trombley v. United States, 666 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1982); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit does not
recognize the existence of pendent party concept); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
5. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the plaintiff tried to join Spokane County as an additional
defendant to a claim against her employer based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), the Civil Rights
Act. The Court held that the Civil Rights Act specifically excluded counties from liability and thus
denied pendent party jurisdiction. /d. Two years after the Aldinger decision, the Court in Monell
v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruled prior cases
holding that municipal corporations are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. 427 U.S. at 18-19. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
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cise of pendent party jurisdiction ov~r additional parties who have no
independent basis of federal jurisdiction. 7
This casenote reviews the history and development of pendent
party jurisdiction as a valid, essential judicial tool. Next follows an examination of the Court's reasoning for prohibiting pendent party jurisdiction in the FTCA context in Finley. The note then explores the inconsistencies between the Court's reasoning in Finley and its reasoning
in past pendent party decisions. Finally, the note examines the significance of the holding in the application of pendent party jurisdiction to
other federal claims.

II.
A.

HISTORY OF PENDENT PARTY jURISDICTION

Definition and Debate

For years federal courts have struggled with the application of
pendent party jurisdiction, a judicially-created concept which evolved
from pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. 8 Pendent, ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction all address the issue of whether federal courts
may adjudicate nonfederal claims and/or claims involving nonfederal
parties. 9
Pendent jurisdiction allows a claimant to attach a related claim
7. 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
8. See, P.f(., Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (allowed plaintiff
to meet the diversity statute's $10,000 amount in controversy threshold by aggregating claims
against two separate defendants); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir.
1966) (also allowed aggregation of claims and multiple parties to meet the diversity amount in
controversy threshold); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (allowed joinder
of an additional plaintiff in diversity suit although plaintiff was not diverse from defendants). The
Supreme Court refused to allow courts to use pendent jurisdiction to join parties together to meet
the amount in controversy threshold for federal diversity in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973).
9. "A considerable body of recent literature suggests that there is no meaningful distinction
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction." Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemmtal jurisdiction, 34 DUKE L.J. 49 (1987) [hereinafter Freer] (citing Matasar, A Pmdent and
Ancillary jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 150-57 (1983); Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary jurisdiction:
Tou•ard a Them)' of incidental jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1935, 1937 (1982); Comment,
Pendent and Ancillary jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV.
1263, 1271-87 (1985)). The Supreme Court has refused to distinguish among the different types
of judicially-created federal jurisdiction:
[W]e think it quite unnecessary to formulate any general, all-encompassing jurisdictional rule. Given the complexities of the many manifestations of federal jurisdiction,
together with the countless factual permutations possible under the Federal Rules,
there is little profit in attempting to decide, for example, whether there are any "principled" differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
AldinKer, 427 U.S. at 13. But see Finle.y, 109 S. Ct. at 2007 ("We specifically disapproved application of the Gibbs [pendent jurisdiction] mode of analysis [to pendent party jurisdiction in Aldinger] finding 'a significant legal difference.'" (citing Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15)).
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with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction to a claim with
proper basis so that all related claims against a defendant can be adjudicated in a single proceeding. 10 Ancillary jurisdiction allows a party
to the suit, usually a third-party defendant, to assert a claim against
another party to the suit after the original claim has been filed,n such
as in "situations involving impleader, cross-claims or counterclaims." 12
Pendent party jurisdiction is a hybrid, drawing from pendent jurisdiction's claim-adding concept and ancillary jurisdiction's party-adding
concept. Pendent party jurisdiction allows a party to the suit, usually a
plaintiff, to assert a related state claim against a new party not named
in the original federal suit. 13
The pendent party jurisdiction debate pits the pragmatic proponent against the theory-bound critic. Pendent party jurisdiction extols
the practical virtues of convenience to litigants and consolidation of
claims in an ever-crowded judicial system. Contrarily, opponents stand
solidly behind the defense of federalism: federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, and thus the adjudication of state claims among
state parties is clearly beyond their constitutionally- and congressionally-granted powers. 14
The pendent party jurisdiction issue takes on even greater significance when the federal claim is a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
action. The FTCA mandates exclusive federal jurisdiction/ 5 forcing a
claimant to split one lawsuit between state and federal court when it
10. Note. Ferlnnl Pn/({1'1// Party jurisdiction and United Mine Workers
Gibbs-Fnlnal Quntwn all!! Dn•rnity CasfS, 62 VA. L. RFV. 194, 195 n.2 (1976).

v.

11. /d. Neither pendent nor ancillary jurisdiction joins a new party to the suit. A pendent
claim is one asserted in the complaint hy plaintiffs against defendants to the suit. In contrast, an
ancillary claim is asserted usually by a nonplaintiff after the original complaint has been filed. /d.
12. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction
requires that the relationship between the primary federal claim and the ancillary nonfederal
claim be one of "logical dependence." /d. at 376. For example, "[a] third-party complaint depends
at least in part upon the resolution of the primary lawsuit." /d.
13. Sei' Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 6, 10.
14. Krogrr, 437 U.S. at 374. "It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or
by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded." !d.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1346lb) (1982). The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together
with the ljnited States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on or after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
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includes other defendants in addition to the United States. 16 For many
claimants, no choice of forum amounts to no choice but to abandon
either the state or the federal claim if limited resources prevent them
from pursuing both. Even if a claimant can finance two claims simultaneously, he or she must further contend with the effects of collateral
estoppel and res judicat~ upon the claim adjudicated later in time. 17
Indeed, these are the very concerns which prompted the creation of
pendent party jurisdiction.

B.

Development

Pendent jurisdiction is rooted in the Supreme Court's interpretation of article III, section 2 of the Constitution, the federal courts' fundamental grant of power over cases and controversies arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 18 In the 1824 case
Osborn v. Bank of the United States/ 9 the Supreme Court determined
that federal court power over cases and controversies included authority
to adjudicate "incidental nonfederal substantive questions" which contain issues forming "an ingredient of the original cause" of action. 20
The Court reasoned that "[t]here is scarcely any case, every part of
which depends on the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States." 21 Osborn thus became the standard authority for the validity of
16. SN Aldingrr, 427 U.S. at 18 ("When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. §
1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together." (footnote omitted));
FinlP)', 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ("Where, as here, Congress' preference for a
federal forum for a certain category of claims makes the federal forum the only possible one in
which the constitutional case may be heard as a whole, the sensible result is to permit the exercise
of pendent-party jurisdiction. Aldinger imposes no obstacle to that result, and I would not reach
out to create one.").
17. Srr United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("[T]he weighty policies
of judicial economy and fairness to parties reflected in rrs judicata doctrine [are] in themselves
strong counsel for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state
as well as the federal claims.").
18. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another state;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
19. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
20. /d. at 822-23.
21. /d.
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pendent jurisdiction.
Lower federal courts gradually expanded pendent jurisdiction, the
addition of claims, into pendent party jurisdiction, the addition of parties.22 After 1966, courts exercised pendent party jurisdiction with more
confidence and frequency after the Supreme Court upheld pendent jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 23 specifically noting in the
opinion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "strongly encourage"
the "joinder of claims, parties and remedies." 24 Pendent party jurisdiction, unlike pendent jurisdiction, was not created in the Supreme
Court, and has had to fight for legitimacy through Supreme Court review.25 In the pre-Finley case, Aldinger v. Howard, 26 the Supreme
Court impliedly validated the existence of pendent party jurisdiction. It
did not strike down the concept altogether, but simply denied application of pendent party jurisdiction to a specific federal statute. The Aldinger Court held that the claimant could not join a county as an additional defendant in a Civil Rights Action 27 because the Act expressly
excluded counties from liability thereunder. 28 Similarly, the Court did
not approve the addition of parties under an ancillary jurisdiction theory in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger. 29 Therein, the
Court held that the federal diversity statute 30 did not allow the plaintiff
to join a "new and independent" claim against a nondiverse third-party
defendant. The Court reasoned that since the diversity statute is traditionally narrowly construed to require complete diversity, such a situation would contravene clear congressional intent. 31
Aldinger and K rogn, together with the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction
case, appeared to provide lower courts with a series of tests for determining whether pendent party jurisdiction properly could be applied to
22.
23.
24.
25.

Srr

111jna note 8.
383 U.S. 715. Srr lltjna note 8.
383 U.S. at 724.
Note, Prnrlnll Parlr jurisdirtion and Srrtiou 1983: Whm Has Congrrss 'By !utjJ!imNrgatnf' jurisrlirtiou~, 14 FoRDHAM URII. L.J. 873, 898 (1986) [hereinafter By

tion
Implimtionj.
26. Srr

111pra note 5 and accompanying text.

27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1'!82).

28. Alrllllgn, 427 U.S. at 16. Ser supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1 '!82).
31. Krogrr, 437 U.S. at 373-74. The Court reasoned:
"Over the years Congress has repeatedly re-enacted or amended the statute conferring
diversity jurisdiction, leaving intact this rule of complete diversity. Whatever may have
been the original purposes of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, this subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate that diversity is not I<J be available
when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant.
!d. (citations omitted).
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specific federal causes of action. Upon these precedents, most courts of
appeals found pendent party jurisdiction proper in FTCA actions, 32
with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, which consistently held that
pendent party jurisdiction simply did not exist. 33 While Finle_y '1'.
United States settled the FTCA controversy, it left open, as before, the
question of whether a federal statute exists which is amenable to pendent party jurisdiction.

III.

Finley v. United States:

FACTUAL SuMMARY

On the night of November 11, 1983, Petitioner Barbara Finley's
family was killed when their airplane struck electric transmission
power lines owned by San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) and
crashed. Finley originally filed an action in San Diego Superior Court
against SDG&E for negligent placement of the transmission lines and
against the City of San Diego for negligence in maintaining and operating the runway approach lights. 34 When Finley discovered that the
FAA, not San Diego, was responsible for the runway lights, she filed
an FTCA action against the United States and then tried to add
SDG&E and San Diego as codefendants. San Diego and SDG&E filed
indemnity actions against the United States in state court. 311
The district court granted the motion to amend and chose to exercise pendent party jurisdiction over the two additional defendants. 36
The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which summarily reversed. 37 Finley's subsequent appeal was
granted certiorari. 38 U pan review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FTCA does not authorize the use of pendent party
jurisdiction. 39

32. Srr .\Upra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. SrP 1UjJra note 4.
34. 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
35. lrl.
36. The district court based its assertion of jurisdiction on Gibbs, "finding it 'clear' that
'judicial economy and efficiency' favored trying the actions together and concluding that they arose
'from a common nucleus of operative fact.'" !d. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. A-8 to A-9).

37. M
38. Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988).
39. 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
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THE SuPREME CouRT's REASONING

GibfJs Test Inapplicable

After the Supreme Court outlined a test for pendent jurisdiction in

Gibbs, 40 lower federal courts frequently applied it to determine whether
claims involving pendent parties were sufficiently related to the federal
claims to invoke jurisdiction. Likewise, Finley's attorneys relied upon
Gibbs to demonstrate that Finley's claim against San Diego and
SDG&E and her claim against the United States together comprised a
single interrelated suit. They did not anticipate the Supreme Court's
quick, blunt severance of pendent party jurisdiction from pendent jurisdiction. The Court flatly refused to extend the Gibbs approach to pendent parties, 41 noting that a " 'significant legal difference' " 42 exists between the two concepts. The Court dismissed the tight fit of the Gibbs
test to the Finle)' facts as a demonstration that the added claims and
original complaint had "'mere factual similarit[ies],' " 43 an insufficient
basis for jurisdiction.

B.

Statutory Language Does Not Support jurisdiction

When creating statutes, Congress does not always extend the
power of the federal courts to the limits of the Constitution. 44 To determine whether Congress intended the FTCA to support pendent parties,
the Finley Court examined the jurisdiction-granting portion of the Act
rather than assume that Congress had authorized full constitutional
power. 46
The FTCA mandates that " 'the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States' "
which allege that federal employees have committed tortious activity in
the scope of their employment. 46 Construing the FTCA jurisdictional
40. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The Gibbs test mandated that (1) the federal claim must be
substantial so as to solidly invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the state and federal
claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"; and (3) the claimant would ordinarily expect the two claims to be tried together in the same proceeding. lrl.
41. 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
42. lrl at 2007.
43. lrl at 2008.
44. For example, while the Constitution requires only minimum diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states), the Supreme Court has interpreted the
diversity statute, 26 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) as requiring complete diversity (no plaintiff and defendant ran be citizens of the same state). Sn Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). This meaning. however, is derived from implied congressional intent with a judicial gloss rather than from
express congressional intent codified as statute.
45. 109 S. Ct. at 2007.
46. Irl. at 2005 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
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statute narrowly, the Court read the inclusion of the United States as
defendant as an exclusion of any other defendants. Analogizing the narrow interpretation given the federal diversity statute language to the
FTCA language, the Court reasoned, "Just as the statutory provision
'between . . . citizens of different States' has been held to mean citizens
of different States and no one else, so also here we conclude that
'against the United States' means against the United States and no one
else. " 47

C.

Legislativl' History Devoid of /ntl'nt

The Court also struck down Finley's attempt to infer FTCA amenability to pendent party jurisdiction from legislative history. Finley
argued that a 1948 statutory language change from " 'exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim against
the United States' " to " 'exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States' " implied a broadening of the court's
jurisdiction to hear all claims within a civil action as long as the United
States was a defendant to one claim. 48 However, the Court characterized the difference as a minor wording change rather than an express
substantive change. 49 Furthermore, the Court noted that legislative history from 1948 was not relevant to pendent party jurisdiction, since the
concept "was not considered remotely viable until Gibbs" in 1966. 110

D.

State Sovl'rl'ignty and Fl'dl'ralism

In K rogl'r, the Court had recognized that the limitation of an exclusive federal forum was a factor to consider in determining proper
application of pendent party jurisdiction. 51 However, in Finley, the
Court retreated from that view and instead took a strong federalism
stance. The Court abandoned judicial pragmatism in the face of a perceived threat to state sovereignty, observing that " 'neither the convenience of the litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice
to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.' " 52

47. !d. at 2008 (citations omitted).
48. !d. at 2009 (emphasis in original).
49. /d. "We have found no suggestion, much less a clear expression, that the minor rewording at issue here imported a substantive change." /d.

50. /d. at 2010.
51. 437 U.S. at 376-77.
52. 109 S. Ct. at 2008.
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Charting a Clear Course for Congress

Finally, the Finley Court bolstered its decision by declaring that
the FTCA jurisdiction interpretation would reinforce the pattern of
uniform interpretations the Court had established in Zahn v. International Paper Co. ,5 3 Aldinger/'" and Kroger. 55 Finley, the Court reasoned, would give Congress "a background of clear interpretive rules"
against which to legislate, "so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." 56
Continuing in the vein of previous pendent party denials, the
Court held that the FTCA, as a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving a particular party, the United States, "does not itself confer
jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties." 117
This holding, however, seems to defeat the very purpose of pendent
jurisdiction. If a statute expressly authorizes the joinder of parties, as
the Court requires, parties do not need to request an exercise of pendent party jurisdiction. While the Court may have cleared the surface
analysis of the issue for Congress and perhaps for the lower courts, it
seems to have muddied the underlying purposes of the pendent party
jurisdiction theory. That a statute would explicitly grant pendent party
jurisdiction seems an oxymoron. After Finley, it remains to be seen
which statutes, if any, support pendent party jurisdiction.

V.

A.

ANALYSIS: INCONSISTENCIES IN THE COURT'S REASONING

Aldinger Standard Abandoned Without Discussion

With good reason, the Finley dissenters charged the new Court
with essentially ignoring the test for pendent party jurisdiction the previous Court had fashioned over a 12-year period in the Gibbs-AldingerK roger line of cases. "The Court's holding is not faithful to our precedents and casually dismisses the accumulated wisdom of our best
judges," wrote Justice Stevens. 118
Indeed, the majority opinion did not "so much as acknowledg[ e ]"
the Aldingn holding, which designated the test for pendent party jurisdiction to be whether Congress had expressly or impliedly negated the
53. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Therein, the Court determined that in a class action, each plaintiff
individually had to satisfy the $10,000 minimum claim requirement of the diversity statute and
that plaintiffs could not satisfy the minimum by grouping together their claims to add up to
$10,000. /d. ill 301.
54. 427 l · S. 1 (1 'J76). Sl'f supra note 5.
55. 417 t.:.s. :\65 (1978).
56. 109 S Ct. at 2010.
57. Jrl.
58. 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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existence of pendent party jurisdiction for a particular statute. 119
Rather, the FinlPy Court required the inverse of that test, that there be
an exprpss affirmation of party joinder, not a impliPd nPgation. The
difference may mean the demise of the pendent party jurisdiction
theory. 60
FinlPy and the pendent party jurisdiction issues seem to have been
decided in a vacuum. That is, the Court seemed to commit the same
flaw it pointed out to Finley in attempting to justify pendent party jurisdiction in a legislative history that could not possibly have intended
the concept. 61 The intent of the jurisdiction-granting portion of the
FTCA was not to exclude certain parties from litigation in federal
court; rather, it was to exclude state courts from adjudicating tort cases
against the United States. 62
In requiring express affirmation rather than implied negation, the
Court now seems to expect the legislature to build into each federal
statute a judicially-created concept. However, if Congress designs a
statute expressly authorizing joinder of additional parties, the purpose
of pendent party jurisdiction is defeated and the need for it dissipates. 63
By definition, pendent party jurisdiction is invoked only in thf' absmce
of such a grant. 64
In short, FinlPy leaves open the question of whether pendent party
jurisdiction exists at all. The Court has developed an analysis that necessarily reaches a predestined end, rendering the analysis itself a futile
59. !d. at 2010 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); srr id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("If .4/din{.;rr I'. Hou•ard required us to ask whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
embraced 'an ajjinnatii•r grant of pendent-party jurisdiction, I would agree with the majority that
no such specific grant of jurisdiction is present. But, in my view, that is not the appropriate
question under Aldinwr.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the problems
the Aldin{.;N test elicits, see Freer, supra note 9; By Implication, supra note 25; Bagwell, Frdrral
Prndmt Party juri.sdiction and Pnulrncy in Dil•rrsity Casrs, 38 ALA. LAw. 333 (1977).
60. Finlry. 109 S. Ct. at 2011.
61. In requiring courts to review legislative history for an indication of congressional intent
to allow or deny pendent party jurisdiction, "[t]he Court has sanctioned an ad hoc search of legislative intent despite the rather obvious fact that Congress, in passing the general jurisdictional
statutes, has never expressly considered supplemental jurisdiction." Freer, supra note '>.
62. In statutory interpretation, courts are to presume that concurrent jurisdiction exists unless the presumption is rebutted by explicit statutory language, unmistakable implied intent from
legislative history, or clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
63. Finlr)', I 09 S. Ct. at 2019 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Justice Blackmun argued that the statutory "affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdiction" the majority required in Finlry does not make sense like the Aldin{.;rr "express or implied
negation" test. "[T]he Aldingrr test would be rendered meaningless if the required intent could be
found in the failure of the relevant jurisdictional statute to mention the type of party in question,
'because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as to
whom Congress has impliedly "addressed itseir' by not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.'" /d. at 2010-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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effort. If the Court's purpose was to require express jurisdiction, it
could have simply invalidated the concept of pendent party jurisdiction
in a matter of sentences.

B.

Diversity v. Federal Question: Gibbs Application

The majority fails to distinguish between diversity and federal
question cases in the pendent party jurisdiction issue. 611 The diversity
statute expressly negates the addition of nondiverse parties. 66 Conversely, federal question cases do not require each defendant to have an
independent basis of jurisdiction; instead, the focus is on the type of
case or controversy. 67
Contrary to the Court's opinion, the Gibbs test is especially applicable in federal question cases. In Aldinger, the Court found the pendent jurisdiction issue in Gibbs to be legally and factually different
from the pendent party issue. 68 However, in that same opinion, the
Court espoused that pendent party claims should be analyzed under the
Gibbs article III test and the Aldinger congressional intent test:
"Before it can be concluded that such jurisdiction exists, a federal court
must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in
the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication
negated its existence." 69 Likewise, in Kroger, the Court stated: "The
Aldinger and Zahn cases thus make clear that . . . the test of Gibbs,
does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear
the nonfederal claims along with the federal ones." 70
Thus, Gibbs is not inapplicable to pendent party jurisdiction; it is
one-half of an essential test to determine constitutional and congressional intent. Since federal question jurisdiction turns on the nature of
the case or controversy, it makes more sense first to apply the Gibbs test
to determine whether all of the claims and parties comprise a single
case or controversy and then to apply the Aldinger test to check for
congressional negation, rather than simply to search for a nonexistent
affirmative legislative intent, as the Finley test mandates. 71 Such a
holding would have been consistent with the Court's earlier finding
65. !d. at 2018.
66. SPr supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. Freer, wpra note 9, at 63.
68. Aldinwr, 427 U.S. at 14-15.
69. !d. at 18.
70. Krop;n. 437 U.S. at 373.
71. Where state-law claims against a pendent party are joined to FTCA actions, "the fact
that such claims are within the exclusive federal jurisdiction, together with the absence of any
evidence of congressional disapproval of the exercise . . . , provides a fully sufficient justification
for applying the holding of Gibbs to this case." 109 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that it is reasonable to assume that "Congress did not intend to confine
the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to
protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined
lawsuit." 72

C.

Implications for Other Federal Statutes

1.

Strict interpretations analogous to FTCA language
Finley has provided a clear-albeit narrow and theoretically non-

sensical-test for determining whether a statute supports pendent party
jurisdiction. That is, courts interpreting statutes which refer to either
particular types of defendants or particular types of plaintiffs often find
that Finley has clearly negated pendent party jurisdiction. Two recent
examples are the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 73 which is
aimed at railroad defendants, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RIC0), 74 aimed at plaintiffs injured by specific RICO violations.
In Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. ,7 r. the Eighth Circuit
strictly analogized the Finley interpretation of the FTCA jurisdiction
grant-"against the United States and no one else" 76 -to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA) when the pendent party was not a
railroad. 77 The court held that FELA expressly negates pendent party
jurisdiction because it provides that "( e )very common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable" and that "( u )nder this chapter an action may
be brought in a district court of the United States." 78 It reasoned that
this statutory language was "a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties," which extended to railroads and no one else. 79
Similarly, in Hall American Center Associates v. Dick, 80 the district
court did not allow plaintiffs whose federal RICO claims were dismissed to remain in federal court to pursue state contract law claims,
noting that the language of RICO "confers jurisdiction over persons
72. Kroga, 437 U.S. at 377.
73. Sff 45 U.S.C. §§51, 56 (1981).
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-86 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. 894 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1990).
76. Finln, 109 S. Ct. at 2008.
77. 894 F.2d at 302.
78. Finlry, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (citation omitted).
79. Lockard, 894 F.2d at 302. Sn Ezell v. Burlington N.R.R., 724 F. Supp. 863, 865 (D.
Wyo. 1989) (Court denied pendent party jurisdiction over nonrailroad in FELA action because
"[p]laintiff does not allege that [defendant] fits the definition of a common carrier by railroad. The
language of FELA clearly restricts the jurisdiction marked out by Congress to employee actions
against common carriers by railroad.").
80. 726 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing Finlry, 109 S. Ct. at 2008).
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injured by RICO violations and only over those persons-'no one
else.' " 81

2.

Interpretations based upon Finley dicta

After 1976, most federal courts followed the Aldinger dicta which
clearly suggested that the FTCA may support pendent party jurisdiction.82 The dicta proved unreliable. As in Aldinger, the Finley Court
suggested examples of statutory language which might support pendent
parties. The Court stated that jurisdiction-granting statutes which read
" 'civil actions on claims that include requested relief against the
United States' " and " 'civil actions in which there is a claim against
the United States'" may indicate minimum rather than maximum jurisdiction requirements. 83
Acting upon this dicta, the Ninth Circuit, in a direct about-face,
granted pendent party jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 84 in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kane Corp. 86 The FSIA provides for district court jurisdiction over "any nonjury civil action against
a foreign state," 86 language the court found "virtually indistinguishable" from the examples given in Finley.
Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Comas, 87 the First Circuit determined
that the Civil Rights Act 88 allowed the joinder of plaintiff's wife as a
pendent party plaintiff. 89 The statute grants jurisdiction over "any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person" 90 and the
substantive portion does not exclude plaintiff's wife. The court found
the section 1983 language a "broadly worded jurisdictional grant"
81. The RICO jurisdiction-granting portion of the statute provides that "[a]ny person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor
in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee" 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
82. SPP supra note 16.
83. 109 S. Ct. at 2008.
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (1985).
85. 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The Ninth Circuit also relied upon legislative history which "suggest[ed] that the plain language of the FSIA accurately reflects Congressional'intent." 892 F.2d at
1409-10. For example, the House Report states that a foreign state may remove FSIA actions to
federal court even if there are multiple defendants and some of them do not want removal or are
citizens of the state in which the action has been brought. /d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976)).
87. 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989).
88. SPP supra note 27.
89. "Unlike the party in Aldingn, [pendent party plaintiff wife] is not a party specifically
excluded from actions brought under Section 1983 claims." 888 F.2d at 905.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a).
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which properly included pendent parties. 91
Two questions stem from the application of FinlPJ to other statutes. First, is the Supreme Court dicta reliable? If reliability is measured by retaining the same justices on the Court, the dicta can be
trusted for the duration of the present Court. The 5-4 FinlPy vote
seems to assure only that the future of the issue remains open to
change. Second, if the statute authorizes the addition of parties, does
the joining of parties constitute pendent party jurisdiction or simply
original jurisdiction? At least one court has concluded from FinlPy that
pendent party jurisdiction "apparently is no longer a viable concept." 92

VI.

CoNCLUSION

Federal courts developed the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction
to bridge the gap between the narrower congressional grant of jurisdiction and the broader constitutional grant of power when one complex
case or controversy demands adjudication in a single forum. Fin!Py
neither recognizes the gap nor the need to overcome it. Instead, the
Supreme Court has fashioned a circular test for determining the propriety of pendent party jurisdiction. That is, finding an express grant of
jurisdictional power negates the very need for pendent party jurisdiction: the effort to move through an analysis leads the analyst nowhere
except to return to the concept of original jurisdiction.
The future for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction under
other federal statutes is unclear and uncharted. While the Supreme
Court has given examples of statutory language which may support
pendent parties, that language is dicta to which the Court may or may
not adhere in the future. While it appears that federal statutes do exist
which appear to meet the new FinlPy standard, it is not clear if pendent
party JUrisdiction remains a necessary bridge over the gap between congressional and constitutional jurisdiction or whether it has been obliterated and absorbed into the concept of original jurisdiction.

Janis T. But/a

91. 88il F.2d at 906.
92. Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 n.S (2d Cir. 1989); Itt LanR'ton v.
Bottlewerks, Inc., No. 89 C 5747 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1989) (summarizing Fi11/ey as "rcjcctinr;
doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction").

